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Fine-grained access control for XML is about controlling access to XML documents
at the granularity of individual elements or attributes. This thesis addresses two
problems related to XML access controls. The first is efficient, secure evaluation of
XPath expressions. We present a technique that secures path expressions by means
of query modification, and we show that the query modification algorithm is correct
under a language-independent semantics for secure query evaluation. The second
problem is to provide a compact, yet useful, representation of the access matrix.
Since determining a user’s privilege directly from access control policies can be
extremely inefficient, materializing the access matrix—the net effect of the access
control policies—is a common approach to speed up the authorization decision
making. The fine-grained nature of XML access controls, however, makes the space
cost of matrix materialization a significant issue. We present a codebook-based
technique that records access matrices compactly. Our experimental study shows
that the codebook approach exhibits significant space savings over other storage
schemes, such as the access control list and the compressed accessibility map. The
solutions to the above two problems provide a foundation for the development of an
efficient mechanism that enforces fine-grained access controls for XML databases
in the cases of query access.
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The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) is a markup language promoted and
standardized by the World Wide Web Consortium [31]. Largely because of its
simplicity and powerful ability to describe information structure, in the past few
years, XML has quickly grown to be the de facto standard of data representation
and data exchange over the web. The amount of data encoded in XML format is
increasing rapidly.
Given the sensitive nature of information, different XML documents or different
portions of an XML document may require different levels of protection. Consider
an XML document that contains the background and compensation information of
all employees of one company. It is very likely that the background information
is less secret and hence can be browsed by everyone in the company. The com-
pensation information, on the other hand, may be more secret and can only be
accessed by the employee and his/her managers. To protect information privacy,
one security question must be answered—how to control the access to XML data.
1
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1.1 Problems and Challenges
The problem of providing access controls for XML data has attracted considerable
attention from both the security community and the database community in recent
years. Much of the work on XML access controls to date, however, has been
performed in the context of XML document management where the documents
to be protected tend to be small and the access requests are often requests for
browsing an entire document [3, 13, 2, 10, 8, 9]. Despite the importance of query
access to XML, relatively little work has been done to enforce access controls for
XML databases in the case of query access. Developing an efficient mechanism for
XML databases to control query-based access is therefore the central theme of this
thesis. In particular, we have focused our attention to two problems: the secure
evaluation of XML queries and the compact representation of access matrices.
These two problems relate to two fundamental components of an access control
mechanism: secure query evaluation is about the development of an effective and ef-
ficient enforcement mechanism that controls query-based access to XML databases,
and the compact representation of an access matrix is about the development of
an effective and efficient decision making mechanism for fine-grained XML access
controls.
1.1.1 Secure Query Evaluation
Secure query evaluation concerns the evaluation of XML queries in the presence
of access controls. It essentially requires the enforcement mechanism to guarantee
that user queries only access, and return, the data items (in XML databases) that
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the user is allowed to access.
An intuitive approach to secure an XML query is to evaluate the query first and
then filter out inaccessible data items from the query result according to the access
control policies. This approach, although attractive, is not secure. It guarantees
that a user’s query won’t return unauthorized data; but it does not guarantee
that the query won’t touch (or check conditions on) unauthorized data during its
evaluation. An alternative approach is to create a user’s accessibility view first, as
if by removing all of the inaccessible data items from the original XML document,
and then evaluate the query against the user’s accessibility view. This approach
is secure and has been widely used to enforce access controls in the context of
XML document management [3, 13, 2, 10, 8, 9]. Unfortunately, when the XML
documents to be protected are large, this approach is not efficient, as generating a
user’s accessibility view is likely to be expensive. Therefore the first problem we are
going to explore is to develop an efficient enforcement mechanism that guarantees
the secure evaluation of XML queries.
1.1.2 Compact Representation of Access Matrix
A decision making mechanism is responsible for determining whether a user is au-
thorized to access a data item in a given mode on the basis of the user’s properties
and the access control policies. Given an authorization inquiry, a decision making
mechanism may derive the authorization decision directly from access control poli-
cies [18, 23, 3, 13, 2, 10, 8, 9]. However, when the policies are sophisticated, this
approach can be extremely inefficient.
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As an access matrix1 captures the net effect of access control policies, one pos-
sible approach for fast authorization decision making is to materialize the access
matrix. For example, we can maintain, for each data item in the XML database,
an access control list recording the users who are authorized to access that data
item. This approach works well in coarse-grained access controls, e.g., in file sys-
tems and relational databases, where access controls are usually enforced at file
level or relation level. In the context of fine-grained access controls, however, it
exhibits significant space overhead. Consider an XML database of 1,000 users in
which every data item (e.g., every element) on average can be accessed by 10% of
the users. Under this approach, each data item in the database, on average, would
maintain a list of 100 users. If each user identifier occupies 2 bytes, the space cost
would be 200 bytes per data item, which is obviously too much, and this space
issue will further deteriorate if we allow access controls to be specified at the level
of attributes. Finding a compact representation for the access matrix is therefore
the second problem we are going to explore.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis makes two contributions. First, we present a technique that enforces the
secure evaluation of XPath expressions by means of query modification, and prove
that this query modification algorithm is correct under a language-independent
semantics for secure query evaluation. Second, we describe and evaluate a codebook
based scheme for the compact representation of access matrices. Our experimental
1The explanation of access matrix can be found in Section 2.3.2.
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study reveals that the codebook scheme exhibits substantial space saving over other
schemes, such as the access control list and the compressed accessibility map. In
most cases, the space cost of the codebook scheme is less than 10% of that of the
CAM scheme.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review some
preliminary concepts, including XPath, twig queries, and the access control sys-
tems. In Chapter 3, we first introduce a language-independent semantics for secure
query evaluation. Then, on the basis of that semantics, we present a query modi-
fication algorithm for the secure evaluation of XPath expressions. An overview of
the correctness proof of the query modification algorithm is provided at the end of
the chapter. In Chapter 4, we propose a codebook scheme for the compact repre-
sentation of access matrices, and compare its space efficiency with other schemes.




XPath1, as a language for addressing parts of an XML document, is the basis of
many XML languages, such as XSLT and XQuery [29]. It gets the name from the
use of path notations for navigating through the hierarchical structure of an XML
document.
XPath models an XML document as a tree of nodes. It defines seven types of
node: root node, element node, text node, attribute node, namespace node, pro-
cessing instruction node, and comment node. The primary syntactic construct in
XPath is called an expression. An XPath expression is always evaluated within a
context. The context, which is usually specified in the outside evaluation environ-
ment (e.g., in XSLT or XQuery), has five elements:
1At the time of this writing, XPath version 2.0 is still a work in progress. Here we introduce
the basic concepts of XPath version 1.0.
6
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1. A node, i.e., the context node
2. A pair of non-zero positive integers, i.e., the context position and the context
size
3. A set of variable bindings that contain the mapping from variable names to
variable values
4. A function library that contains a mapping from function names to function
definitions
5. A set of namespace declarations in scope for the expression that contains a
mapping from prefixes to namespace URIs
In this thesis, we will use a 6-tuple 〈context-node, context-position, context-size,
variable-bindings, function-library, namespace-decl〉 to denote a context. The result
of an XPath expression is always an object of one of the following four basic types:
1. A node set (an unordered collection of nodes without duplicates)
2. A boolean value (either true or false)
3. A number (a floating-point number)
4. A string (a sequence of UCS characters)
For example, the expression
/descendant::name
is evaluated to be a node-set which contains all name elements descended from the
document root. However, the expression
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/descendant::employee[descendant::name="John"]
/descendant::salary/child::textnode()
is evaluated to a string value, showing the salary of the employee whose name is
John.
The most important type of XPath expression is the location path; it selects
a set of nodes relative to the context node. A location path can be either a rela-
tive location path or an absolute location path. An absolute location path, which
starts with a forward slash (“/”), is evaluated with respect to the root node of the
document, whereas a relative location path, without the leading slash, is evaluated
with respect to the current context node. The following are some valid location
path expressions.
1. child::employee selects the employee elements which are children of the
context node
2. descendant::name selects the name elements which are descendants of the
context node
3. descendant::contact/child::name selects the name elements which are chil-
dren of the contact elements which, in turn, are descendants of the context
node
4. descendant::employee[last()] selects the last employee element which is
a descendant of the context node
5. /descendant::employee[position()=1]/descendant::salary selects the
salary element of the first employee
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6. /descendant::employee[descendant::salary>70000]/descendant::name
[starts-with(child::textnode(), "J")] selects the name elements of the
employees whose salary is greater than 70,000 and whose name starts with a
letter J
A location path consists of one or more location steps separated by “/”. For
example, the expression
descendant::employee/descendant::name
has two location steps: the descendant::employee and the descendant::name.
A location path is evaluated from left to right, one step at a time. The initial
step selects a set of nodes relative to a context node; each node in the result set
generated by the initial step, then, is used as a context node for the second step.
The union of the sets of nodes identified by the second step is the result of the
composition of the first two steps. If there exists a third step, each node in the
union will then be used as a context node for the evaluation of the third step, and
so on, until all of the location steps are processed.
The syntax of a location step is axisname::nodetest[predicate]*. For ex-
ample, in the expression
descendant::employee[last()]
descendant is the name of the axis, employee is the node test and [last()]
is a predicate. The axis name specifies the tree relationship between the nodes
to be selected and the context node. The node test specifies the node type and
the expanded-name of the nodes to be selected. The predicates are expressions
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used to further refine the node set selected by the axis and the node test. In our
example, the initial node set selected by the axis name and the node test (i.e.,
the descendant::employee) is a set containing all of the employee element nodes
which are children of the context node. This initial node set will be further refined
by predicate [last()]; the final result is therefore the set that contains the last
employee element node only.
Location paths, which are used to select nodes from an XML document, are just
special cases of XPath expressions. A general XPath expression is more powerful;
it allows users to do operations on the node sets selected by location paths. The
operations include function calls (e.g., the function last()), logical operations (e.g.,
and, or), numeric operations (e.g., +,-), and so on. For instance, an expression that






involves several location paths, two function calls and one union operation. XPath
1.0 defines a core function library which must be supported by all XPath imple-
mentations. This core function library includes four categories of functions: node
set functions, string functions, boolean functions and number functions. Besides
that, XPath also permits users to extend the core function library by defining new
functions.
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In order to simplify the syntax of expressions, XPath 1.0 defines a set of syntac-
tic abbreviations. One of the most important abbreviation is that the axis name
“child::” can be omitted from a location step. For example, the expression
employee/name
is equivalent to the expression
child::employee/child::name
Other abbreviations include:
1. “@” is the abbreviation of “attribute::”
2. “.” is the abbreviation of “self::node()”
3. “..” is the abbreviation of “parent::node()”
4. “//” is the abbreviation of “/descendant-or-self::node()/”
For example, the expression
//contact[../employee/@gender="male"]
is an abbreviation of the expression
/descendant-or-self::node()/child::contact
[parent::node()/child::employee/attribute::gender="male"]
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2.2 Twig Query
A twig query, or a tree pattern query, is a rooted node-labeled tree such that
(1) its nodes are labeled by element tags or string values, (2) its edges are either
single edges (representing parent-child relationship) or double edges (representing
ancestor-descendant relationship), and (3) a subset of nodes is distinguished, usu-











Figure 2.1: Examples of Twig Queries
Figure 2.1 shows two examples of twig queries. Twig query (a) can be expressed
as a single XPath expression:
/child::employeelist/child::employee/child::contact/child::name
Twig query (b) can be expressed as
/child::employeelist/descendant::name
A twig query is answered by finding matchings. Suppose q is a twig query with
nodes (u1, . . . , un). A matching is a function that maps q’s nodes to nodes in
the database such that all node predicates are satisfied and, further, the structural
relationships (e.g., parent-child relationship or ancestor-descendant relationship)
between nodes in q are satisfied. A matching, which binds each node ui in the
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query to a node xi in the database, results in a binding tuple (x1,. . . ,xn). The final
answer to a twig query is produced by projecting out, from the binding tuples, the
nodes that are not in the projection list.
Comparing with XPath expressions, twig queries are relatively simple, as they
have only two axes, the child and the descendant, and they do not permit func-
tions and operators.
2.3 Access Control Basics
The goal of database security is to protect the secrecy, integrity, and availability of
data against unintentional or malicious threats.
Establishing a secure database is a complex task. Access control, which gov-
erns the direct access to databases, deals with only one of many crucial issues in
database security. Besides access control, the other security issues that must be
considered include authentication, auditing, and even the security control of the
underlying operating system and network. While these issues are equally impor-
tant for maintaining the security of a database, they are not in the scope of this
thesis.
An access control system is logically composed of two parts: an access control
policy that describes the security requirements and an access control mechanism
that enforces the given policy. Ideally, the specification of access control policies
should be distinct from the implementation of the access control mechanisms, in
which case, an access control policy can be enforced by different mechanisms, and
an access control mechanism can enforce multiple policies.
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2.3.1 Access Control Policies
An access control policy is a high level guideline that specifies the security require-
ments of a database; it describes the access privileges of the users in the database,
and states how the access privileges should be administered. In general, there are
three types of access control policies: discretionary policies, mandatory policies and
role based policies.
Discretionary Access Control Policy
Discretionary access control (DAC) policies govern access to objects2 on the basis
of user identities and authorizations [16]. A major property of discretionary policies
is that the decisions of granting and revoking access privileges (on an object) are
left to the discretion of individual users. In other words, in discretionary policies,
a user with a certain access privilege (e.g., read, write, or execute) is capable of
passing that privilege on to other users.
A discretionary access control policy can be specified as a collection of autho-
rizations, each of which, conceptually, is a 〈subject, object, mode〉 tuple, stating
that subject is authorized to access object in access mode3 mode. Since such an
authorization always grants a privilege to a user, it is also called a positive au-
thorization. A user’s request to access an object is checked against the specified
authorizations; if there exists an authorization stating that the user can access the
object in the specific mode, the access is granted, otherwise it is denied.
2We use the term object to refer to an arbitrary unit of access control in a database.
3We use the term access mode to refer to a privilege, e.g., read, write, or execute.
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However, in a large database with thousands of users and millions of objects,
specifying an access control policy in terms of positive authorizations in this manner
may be tedious. To ease the task of policy specification, implicit authorizations and
negative authorizations are introduced.
Implicit authorizations, in contrast to explicit authorizations, are not explicitly
specified by the users and the security administrators; instead, they are derived
from explicit authorizations, according to some pre-defined derivation rules. The
derivation rules, usually defined by the security administrators, direct how to derive
implicit authorizations from explicit authorizations. Suppose, for instance, there
is an explicit authorization stating that group faculty has read privilege on
the report document. This authorization may derive implicit authorizations for
the members of the faculty group. As a result, Professor Ross, who doesn’t
have explicit authorizations specified but is a member of group faculty, may be
permitted to read document report.
Whereas positive authorizations always grant privileges, a negative authoriza-
tion expresses the notion of denying a user’s access to an object. The adoption
of negative authorizations is largely due to the need to express exceptions. Con-
sider an example in which we want to authorize all members of group faculty the
privilege to read document report, except for Professor Ross. If only positive
authorizations are allowed, we have to specify one authorization for each member in
group faculty, excluding Ross. With negative and implicit authorizations, this
can be expressed by only two authorizations: a positive authorization for group
faculty and a negative authorization for Professor Ross.
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The coexistence of positive and negative authorizations, however, may introduce
conflicts. In our previous example, Ross, who has an explicit negative authorization
on document report, also has an implicit positive authorization as being a member
of the faculty. In this case some conflict resolution rules must be specified. In
short, the effect of implicit authorizations and negative authorizations is twofold.
On one hand, it largely simplifies the task of policy specification. On the other
hand, it greatly complicates the authorization decision making.
Although discretionary access control policies are flexible and widely used in
commercial environments, they have one inherent security flaw. They are unable
to secure the data flow in a system. This flaw makes the system vulnerable to Trojan
horse attacks. Systems that require data flow controls usually use mandatory access
control policies.
Mandatory Access Control Policy
Mandatory access control (MAC) policies govern access to objects based on the
sensitivity of the information contained in the objects and the trustworthiness of
users. In MAC, every object is assigned a security level, called classification, which
reflects the sensitivity of the information contained in the object; every user is as-
signed a security level, called clearance, which reflects the trustworthiness of the
user. Security levels are usually elements of a partially ordered set. For exam-
ple, a common set of security levels for military system is {topsecret, secret,
confidential, unclassified}, where topsecret is the most secure level and
unclassified is the least secure level.
Most mandatory policies impose the following two restrictions: (1) A subject is
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authorized to read an object only if the clearance of the subject is no less than the
classification of the object, and (2) a subject is authorized to write an object only
if its clearance is no higher than the object’s classification. Enforcement of these
two principles ensures that the information can only flow within the same security
level or upward to higher security levels, and, thus, can never leak to lower levels.
Mandatory access control policies and discretionary access control policies can be
used together to strengthen access controls.
Role Based Access Control Policy
Role based access control (RBAC) policies are supplements to the discretionary
policies and the mandatory policies. In RBAC, users are assigned roles based on
their competencies and responsibilities in the organization. The process of defining
roles is usually based on a thorough analysis of how an organization operates. The
operations the user is permitted to perform and the objects the user is authorized
to access are determined by the active roles the user assumes. Most systems allow
a single user to adopt different roles on different occasions. Also the same role
can be played by several users. Although the concept of role in RBAC resembles
the group in discretionary access controls, they are two different concepts. In
discretionary access controls, the allocation of access privileges to groups is usually
determined at the discretion of individual users, whereas in RBAC, the allocation
of access privileges to roles, as well as determination of membership in a role, are
determined by the security administrator.
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2.3.2 Access Control Mechanisms
An access control mechanism enforces a given access control policy by ensuring that
all direct access to the database is in accordance with that policy. An access control
mechanism has two basic functions: decision making and decision enforcement.
Decision Making
Decision making is a process of deriving access control decisions on the basis of
the user’s identity and the access control policies. Regardless how an access control
policy is specified, the net effect of a policy can be captured by a matrix, namely the
access matrix. The rows of the matrix represent users, and the columns represent
objects. A matrix entry, say A[s, o], contains the access modes in which user s is
authorized to access object o. Table 2.1 shows an access matrix for a toy file system
whose structure is shown in Figure 2.2. From the access matrix, we can tell that
user s1 has read and write privileges on object o1, and user s3 has only read
privileges on object o2, o4, and o5.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6
s1 r w
s2 r w r w r w
s3 r r r
s4 r r w w
Table 2.1: Access Matrix A
A common variation of the access matrix is the access cube whose three di-
mensions are user, object, and access mode, respectively. The entries of an access
cube are boolean values, either 1 or 0. An access cube entry, say A[s, o,m], is 1 if




Figure 2.2: Directory Tree of the Toy File System
and only if user s is authorized to access object o in access mode m. The access
matrix and the access cube are two different representations of the access control
information or, equivalently, the net effect of the access control policies.
Suppose A′ is the access cube corresponding to the access matrix A in Table
2.1. Table 2.2 shows a planar expression of the access cube A′. Each table in Table
2.2 represents a slice of A′: Table (a) represents the slice of access mode read, and
table (b) represents the slice of access mode write. Access cube A′ tells us that
user s1 is authorized to read object o1, as the entry A′[s1, o1, read] is 1; and
user s1 is not authorized to write object o2, as the entry A′[s1, o2, write] is 0.
A spectrum of techniques can be used to implement decision making mecha-
nisms. At one end of the spectrum, the implementation does not materialize the
access matrix. Authorization decisions are always computed directly from access
control policies upon request. This approach is flexible in that it allows the security
administrators to change the access control policies at run time and the changes
become effective immediately after commitment. However, when the access control
policy is complex, this approach may be inefficient. At the other end of the spec-
trum, the implementation always materializes the access matrix. Consequently,
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o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6
s1 1 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 0 1 1 0
s3 0 1 0 1 1 0
s4 1 0 1 0 0 0
(a) The read Slice
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6
s1 1 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 0 1 1 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0
s4 0 0 1 0 0 1
(b) The write Slice
Table 2.2: Access Cube A′
upon receiving an authorization inquiry, the decision making mechanism can locate
the answer in the materialized access matrix without computing it from scratch.
The trade-off between these two approaches is in the decision computation time
versus the decision search time. If we can somehow materialize the access matrix
in a data structure that takes little space and permits fast lookups, the second ap-
proach may become a promising solution to the speed problem of the first approach.
This is the problem that we are going to explore in Chapter 4.
Decision Enforcement
Decision enforcement is a process that guarantees that a user is always granted (or
denied) access to an object if the authorization decision is affirmative (or negative).
In the context of XML access controls, two techniques are commonly used to control
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Figure 2.3: View Construction Mechanism vs Query Modification Mechanism
The basic concepts of these two approaches are illustrated in Figure 2.3, in
which D represents the base database and qu represents a query posted by user u.
Upon receiving a query qu, a view construction mechanism performs the following
two steps4: (1) create user u’s accessibility view D′u. Conceptually, D
′
u is created
by filtering out all of the objects (from D) which u is not authorized to access; (2)
evaluate query qu against D
′
u. The view construction approach is widely used to
secure small XML documents [10, 8, 13]. However, when D is large, this approach
may become inefficient, as generating a user’s accessibility view is likely to be
expensive.
An alternative approach is query modification. As shown in Figure 2.3, upon
receiving query qu, the query modification mechanism will
5 (a) rewrite query qu
to query q′u, and (b) evaluate the modified query q
′
u against the base database D.
4Refers to the steps marked as (1) and (2) in Figure 2.3.
5Refers to the steps marked as (a) and (b) in Figure 2.3.
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The query modification algorithm should guarantee that the result of evaluating q′u




The query modification approach exhibits a few advantages over the view con-
struction approach. First, it avoids the expensive computation of the accessibility
view. Second, it does not require changes to the query evaluator. Third, since
the modified queries are queries against the base database D, this approach allows
the query evaluator to utilize the existing indexes maintained on D. The down-
side of the query modification approach is that the query modification algorithm




Secure query evaluation refers to the evaluation of queries with respect to the
issuer’s privileges, or, in other words, the evaluation of queries in the presence of
access controls.
With the increasing popularity of XML, managing XML documents using con-
ventional file management techniques is not sufficient; users require more flexible
query approaches and more reliable storage management. Driven by this demand,
research on XML data management has attracted considerable attention from the
database community in recent years. Many XML databases have been developed,
and many XML query languages have been proposed. A security problem brought
on by the emergence of XML databases is how to protect the XML data in case of
query access, or, how to evaluate XML queries securely so that sensitive information
won’t leak out to unauthorized users through query evaluation.
In this chapter we consider the secure evaluation of XPath expressions. We
have chosen XPath expressions as our focus because they are the means by which
23
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major XML query languages, such as XSLT and XQuery, address parts of XML
documents [32, 30]. Specifically, we consider the path expressions defined in XPath
specification version 1.0, because, at the time of this writing, XPath 2.0 is still a
work in progress and not completely defined yet [29].
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we introduce the data model
and the security model that will be used in this chapter. In Section 3.2, we define
the semantics of secure query evaluation. Based on that semantics, we present a
technique that secures path expressions by means of query modification, in Section
3.3. Finally, in Section 3.4, we give a brief overview of the correctness proof of the
query modification algorithm.
3.1 Models of XML Data and Access Control
An XML database contains a collection of XML documents. Every XML docu-
ment has a logical hierarchical structure. A collection of XML documents, when
they are organized hierarchically, also has a hierarchical structure, just like files in
Unix can be organized hierarchically in a directory tree. Based on this observa-
tion, we model the data in an XML database as an ordered tree, namely an XML
database tree. The nodes represent various types of objects in the database, e.g.,
elements or attributes, and the arcs represent various types of relationships, e.g.,
element-subelement relationships or element-attribute relationships. Our model is
a simplification of the data model adopted by XPath 1.0. We do not distinguish
data type. No matter what type the object is, it is uniformly represented by a
node in the database tree. Moreover, we do not care whether an XML database
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tree represents one single XML document or a collection of XML documents. As
far as what we are concerned, it represents the data in an XML database at the
finest granularity. Hereinafter, the term document and database will be used inter-
changeably to refer to XML data.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of an XML document whose corresponding hi-
erarchical model is shown in Figure 3.2. The number in each node is the node
identifier. This document records the contact and payroll information of the em-
ployees in one company. Every employee element contains one contact element
and one payroll element. The contact element records the employee’s name and
postcode, and the payroll element records the employee’s salary and bonus. In
addition, every employee element has one attribute indicating the gender of the
employee. This is the document we are going to use in the following sections to
explain the query modification algorithm.
Regarding access controls, as we have introduced in Chapter 2, the net effect of
an access control policy can be captured by an access cube, say A. Assuming that
U denotes the set of users, M denotes the set of access modes and O denotes the
set of objects in database D, the access cube A is a |U | × |O| × |M | 3-dimensional
cube that uniquely determines which user can access which object in a given access
mode.
Restricted to a specific user u and access mode m, the access cube A reduces
to a 0-1 vector in which every bit corresponds to an object in D. This vector can
be viewed as a labeling that assigns every node in the database tree a boolean tag,
either 1 or 0, indicating whether this node is accessible with respect to user u and
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access mode m. If we say that an access cube captures the effect of an access control
policy, a labeled database tree, then, captures the effect of an access control policy
for a specific user and access mode.
We assume that the read mode, among many other access modes, is used to
control query access. Figure 3.3, for instance, shows a labeled database tree for
a user (perhaps the user John) who is not permitted to read Mary’s information,
except for her name.
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Figure 3.3: An (Invalid) Access Control Specification that Hides Mary’s Information
3.2 Semantics of Secure Query Evaluation
Before we are able to consider how to evaluate queries securely, we must first un-
derstand what the correct result of a query should be, when it is evaluated in the
presence of access controls.
Intuitively, we may say that a query is securely evaluated if the query uses and
returns only the data that the user is authorized to access. However, this statement
is too vague to be a definition—it does not define the verb “use” clearly. Consider
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the following example. Suppose the labeled database tree Dur in Figure 3.3 reflects
user u’s read rights in database D, and user u wishes to evaluate expression
/descendant::name/child::textnode()
against database D to retrieve the string values of the names of all employees. What
should the safe answer to the query be? It is agreeable that the string John should
be in the result set, as the node itself is accessible and the evaluation (presumably)
does not use any inaccessible node. But what about the string Mary? Should it be
in the result set? In other words, do we use the inaccessible nodes 3 and 8, when we
navigate from node 1 to node 14? This question is unanswerable without further
clarification.
3.2.1 Cho’s semantics
SungRan Cho and his colleagues introduced a semantics for the secure evaluation
of twig queries [7]. According to Cho’s semantics, given a database D with access
controls and a twig query qu with nodes (u1, . . . , un) posed by user u, the safe
answer to query qu is determined by the following procedure:
1. Find out the set of binding tuples, say T . A binding tuple t ∈ T is of the
form (x1, . . . , xn) where xi is a node in D.
2. Generate, from set T , the set of safe binding tuples, say Ts. A binding tuple
t ∈ T is safe if, and only if, every component xi is accessible with respect to
user u.
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3. Generate the safe answer to query qu by projecting set Ts onto the set of
nodes appearing in the projection list.
Suppose, for example, user u wishes to evaluate the twig query (a), shown in
Figure 2.1, against the labeled XML tree in Figure 3.3. This query will find two
binding tuples in database, 〈1, 2, 5, 10〉 and 〈1, 3, 8, 14〉, in which the second one is
unsafe, as it contains the inaccessible nodes 3 and 8. Therefore, the safe answer to
query (a) is the first name element (node 10), created by projecting out, from the
safe binding tuples, the nodes not appearing in the projection list. Similarly, twig
query (b) will find two binding tuples: 〈1, 10〉 and 〈1, 14〉. Since both of tuples are
safe, the safe answer to query (b) is a node set which contains both name elements.
This semantics, although clear, has one weakness: it is language dependent.
Since Cho’s semantics is defined in terms of bindings, a technique specific to the
evaluation of twig queries, it is difficult to apply it to other query languages whose
evaluations don’t rely on binding, like XPath or XQuery. An XML database, how-
ever, is supposed to be queried by various kinds of query languages, not just twig
queries. Ideally, the semantics of secure query evaluation should be defined inde-
pendently of the query language.
3.2.2 View Based Semantics
To settle the problem of Cho’s semantics, we define the semantics of secure query
evaluation in terms of a language independent concept: the accessibility view. An
accessibility view, as defined in Definition 1, is always associated with a user and
an access mode; it is a view (of the original database) that contains only the data
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that the specific user is authorized to access in the given mode. Since this chapter
concerns the security controls for query access, we are especially interested in a
user’s read accessibility view, i.e., the accessibility view in read mode.
Definition 1 (Accessibility View) Let D = {V,E} be an XML database tree
where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges, A be an access cube specified
on D, u be a user and m be an access mode. The accessibility view of user u on
database D with respect to access mode m is D′um = {V ′, E ′}, where V ′ = {o | o ∈
V ∧ A[u, o,m] = 1} and E ′ = {(p, q) | (p, q) ∈ E ∧ p ∈ V ′ ∧ q ∈ V ′}.
Given a database D with access controls and a query qu posted by user u, a
natural idea is that the correct result of query qu should be determined by the
following procedure:
1. Create user u’s read accessibility view D′ur.
2. Evaluate query qu against D
′
ur. The result of evaluating query qu against D
′
ur
is defined as the correct result of the secure evaluation of query qu.
One problem with this natural idea is that a user’s read accessibility view may not
be a tree. For example, the read accessibility view implied by the labeled XML tree
in Figure 3.3 is not a tree, but a forest. From our standing, this view is invalid, as
we are not able to evaluate queries against it. To avoid the problem, we refine the
natural idea and define the semantics of secure query evaluation on a user’s valid
read accessibility view, a relatively narrow concept, as shown in the following two
definitions.
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Definition 2 (Valid Accessibility View) Let D be an XML database tree, D′ur
be user u’s read accessibility view. The view D′ur is valid if, and only if, D
′
ur is a
tree whose root is the same as the root of D.
Definition 3 (Secure Query Evaluation) Let D be an XML database tree, qu
be a query against D posed by user u, and D′ur be user u’s valid read accessibility
view. The correct result of secure evaluation of query qu is defined to be the result
of evaluating query qu against user u’s valid read accessibility view, D
′
ur.
A user’s read accessibility view is determined by the access control policy. In
general, an access control policy may generate valid read accessibility views, or
invalid read accessibility views, or both. Our semantics, however, requires that the
access control policy that is to be enforced must derive valid read accessibility views
only. In other words, if we classify access control policies into two categories—valid
access control policies and invalid access control policies—based on Definition 4,
only valid access control policies can be enforced by our semantics.
Definition 4 (Valid Access Control Policy) Let U be a set of users, D =
{V,E} be an XML database tree where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges,
P be an access control policy whose net effect is captured by an access cube A,
and r be the read mode. Security policy P is valid if, and only if, it does not
derive invalid read accessibility views, i.e., ∀p ∈ U,∀q ∈ V : A[p, q, r] = 0 → ¬∃t ∈
V s.t. (A[p, t, r] = 1 ∧ t is a descendant of q).
Defining the semantics of secure query evaluation on the basis of valid acces-
sibility views sounds like a considerable restriction. However, it is actually not,
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provided that access controls can be specified at the granularity of individual at-
tributes. That is because we can always relax an invalid access control policy a
little bid to make it valid. For example, the invalid access controls illustrated in
Figure 3.3 can be relaxed by making the nodes 3 and 8 readable, as shown in Figure
3.4. These two access controls are not the same. For example, a user who wants
to count the number of employees may find two employees in the view of Figure
3.3, but only one employee in the view of Figure 3.4. Nonetheless, the valid access
controls in Figure 3.4 also successfully hide the contact and payroll information of
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Figure 3.4: A Valid Access Control Specification that Hides Mary’s Information
3.3 Enforcement of Secure XPath Evaluation
We have defined the semantics of secure query evaluation in the previous section.
In this section we consider the enforcement of secure query evaluation, in particular
the enforcement of the secure evaluation of XPath expressions. Assuming that D is
CHAPTER 3. SECURE QUERY EVALUATION 33
an XML database tree, P is a valid access control policy specified on D whose effect
is captured by the access cube A, and qu is an arbitrary XPath expression posted
by user u, our objective is to develop an enforcement mechanism that guarantees
the secure evaluation of qu, with respect to A. Hereinafter, we refer to the user u
as the context user.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two basic approaches for access control en-
forcement: the view construction approach and the query modification approach.
Because, as was explained earlier, the view construction approach is likely to be
expensive, in this section, we describe an approach that enforces the secure evalua-
tion of path expressions by means of query modification. Comparing with the view
construction approach, the query modification approach has the following three
advantages:
1. It avoids the expensive materialization of accessibility views.
2. Since the modified queries are still XPath expressions, they can be passed to
standard XPath evaluators for processing. No changes to an XPath evaluator
is required.
3. Since the modified queries are queries against the original database D, the
query evaluator may utilize the existing indexes maintained on D.
3.3.1 Overview of the Query Modification Algorithm
A correct query modification algorithm is the key to the success of the query mod-
ification approach. Appendix A shows a complete description of the XPath query
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modification algorithm. The algorithm is composed of two parts: a query rewriting
function and a collection of security functions. The query rewriting function is the
heart of the modification algorithm—it defines how a query should be modified; the
security functions, on the other hand, are supporting functions defined in the query
modification algorithm to perform security-related activities. An implementation


















Figure 3.5: Overview of the Query Modification Mechanism
Figure 3.5 shows an overview of the query modification mechanism and its
interactions with other components. The two blocks surrounded by the dashed
lines are together referred to as the query modification mechanism. One is the
implementation of the query rewriting function; the other is the implementation of
the security functions. Given an XPath expression qu and its evaluating context
e, the query rewriting function transforms them into q′u and e
′ respectively, and
passes them to a standard XPath evaluator.1 The XPath evaluator evaluates the
1Some readers may wonder why the query rewriting function modify the evaluating context e?
This question will be addressed later when we discuss the context modification.
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rewritten expression q′u, under the context e
′, against the original database D, and
returns the result. It is the responsibility of the query modification algorithm to
guarantee the correctness of the result, i.e., to guarantee that q′u(D), the result of
evaluating q′u against D, be equal to the result of evaluating qu against user u’s
read accessibility view, qu(D
′
ur).
For example, given an XPath expression qu that returns the string values of the








where the function sec-inview() is a security function for testing a user’s access
rights. We will introduce the security functions and the query rewriting function
in detail in the following two subsections.
3.3.2 Security Functions
Security functions are supporting functions defined in the query modification al-
gorithm to perform security-related activities. Table 3.1 shows a complete list of
security functions. Their definitions are provided in the Section A.2 of Appendix










9 boolean sec-eq(object, object)
10 boolean sec-ne(object, object)
11 boolean sec-le(object, object)
12 boolean sec-lt(object, object)
13 boolean sec-ge(object, object)
14 boolean sec-gt(object, object)
15 number sec-addition(object, object)
16 number sec-subtraction(object, object)
17 number sec-multiply(object, object)
18 number sec-div(object, object)
19 number sec-mod(object, object)
Table 3.1: Security Function List
A. In general, it is easy to tell security functions from XPath standard functions,
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as the names of security functions are always prefixed by “sec-”.
We need security functions for two reasons. First, security functions provide a
means by which the XPath evaluator can communicate with the underlying decision
making mechanism. For example, sec-inview(), is a function that the XPath eval-
uator can use to check the access privileges for a user. Specifically, sec-inview()
returns true if, and only if, the context user is authorized to read the context node
under the access control policy. In other words, it returns true if, and only if,
A[u, cn, r] = 1, where u is the context user, cn is the context node and r is the read
mode.2
Second, security functions are used to replace the insecure functions and opera-
tors. XPath 1.0 defines a set of standard functions and operators, e.g., the function
string(), the function id(), the operator =, the operator +, and so on. Some of
them are insecure. This can be demonstrated by the following two examples.
Consider the standard string() function first. Suppose the tree in Figure 3.2
represents the database D, the labeled tree Dur in Figure 3.4 represents user u’s
read privileges on D, and the tree in Figure 3.6 represents user u’s accessibility
view D′ur, derived from Dur. Suppose user u wishes to evaluate a path expression
string(/child::employeelist)
against D to retrieve the string value of the employeelist element. According to
the XPath specification, the standard string() function, when receiving a node
set as an input argument, will return the concatenation of the string-values of all
2The context user and context node are always available in the evaluation context. We will
explain this when we introduce the context modification.
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Figure 3.6: A Valid Accessibility View
text node descendants of the first node in the given node set. Therefore, the result
of evaluating the above expression against D is the string
‘‘JohnN4W2H87500020000MaryM3R5H38500020000’’
According to our semantics of secure query evaluation, this result is insecure, as
it is not equal to the result of evaluating the same query against the accessibility
view D′ur, i.e., the string “JohnN4W2H87500020000Mary”.
To prevent information from leaking through the insecure string() function, we
developed a secure version, the sec-string(), for the insecure string() function.
The semantics3 of sec-string() is very much like that of the standard string(),
except: when receiving a node set as the input argument, sec-string() will return
the concatenation of string-values of all accessible text node descendants of the
first node in the given node set. Consequently, a secure rewriting of the previous
expression is
sec-string(/child::employeelist)
3The formal definition of sec-string() can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Besides the string() function, there are several other XPath standard functions
that are also insecure. Table 3.2 shows a list of all insecure XPath standard func-
tions, which must be replaced by the query modification algorithm, and their cor-
responding secure functions.













Table 3.2: The Mapping from Insecure Functions to Secure Functions
Now consider an example of an insecure XPath operator. Suppose user u wishes
to evaluate an expression qu
/child::employeelist="JohnN4W2H87500020000MaryM3R5H38500020000"
against D to check if the string-value of the element employeelist equals that
given string. According to the XPath specification, if one operand of the operator
“=” is a node-set (e.g., /child::employeelist) and the other is a string, the result
of the comparison is true if, and only if, there is a node in the node-set such that
the string-value of that node is equal to the argument string; the string-value of a
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node is computed as if by a call to the standard string() function. The previous
example has shown that the string value of element employeelist in D is
‘‘JohnN4W2H87500020000MaryM3R5H38500020000’’
Therefore, the result of evaluating qu against D is true. However, according to
our semantics, this result is insecure, as it is not equal to the result of evaluating qu
against D′ur. The essential reason behind the insecurity of the operator “=” is that
the semantics of the standard “=” operator is defined on the standard string()
function, and the standard string() function, as we have shown, is insecure.
To prevent information from leaking through insecure XPath operators, we de-
veloped a secure function, the sec-eq(), for the insecure operator “=”. The seman-
tics of sec-eq() is very much like that of the standard comparison operator “=”.
But, unlike the standard comparison operator which is defined on the standard
string() function, sec-eq() is defined on the secure sec-string() function. As
a result, a secure rewriting of qu is
sec-eq(/child::employeelist,
"JohnN4W2H87500020000MaryM3R5H38500020000")
Table 3.3 shows a complete list of insecure XPath operators, which must be replaced
by the query modification algorithm, and their corresponding secure functions.
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Insecure Operators Corresponding Secure Functions
= boolean sec-eq(object, object)
!= boolean sec-ne(object, object)
<= boolean sec-le(object, object)
< boolean sec-lt(object, object)
>= boolean sec-ge(object, object)
> boolean sec-gt(object, object)
+ number sec-addition(object, object)
- number sec-subtraction(object, object)
* number sec-multiply(object, object)
div number sec-div(object, object)
mod number sec-mod(object, object)
Table 3.3: The Mapping from Insecure Operators to Secure Functions
3.3.3 Query Rewriting Function
The pseudocode in Figure 3.7 summarizes the XPath query rewriting function4. The
query rewriting function has two parts: the query rewriting part and the context
rewriting part. It can be conceived as a function that takes two arguments—an
XPath expression qu and its initial evaluation context e—and returns the rewritten
expression q′u and the rewritten context e
′. The query rewriting function assumes
that expression qu is in the verbose syntax.
5
Query Modification Part
Given an XPath expression qu posted by user u, the query rewriting function will
rewrite it in the following three steps:
4The formal definition of the XPath query rewriting function is described in Section A.1.
5In order to keep the query rewriting function simple, we assume that the incoming XPath
expression is in the verbose syntax. However, it is easy to adapt the query rewriting function to
handle expressions in abbreviated syntax.
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Figure 3.7 XPath Query Rewriting Function
Query-Rewriting(qu, e)
Begin
// 1. Query Rewriting
q′u ← qu
// a. Insert security check predicates
insert predicate [sec-inview()] after each occurrence
of clause Axis::NodeTest in q′u
// b. Replace insecure functions
replace every occurrence of insecure function in q′u
with its equivalent secure function.
// c. Replace insecure operators
replace every occurrence of insecure operator in q′u
with its equivalent secure function.





e′.variable-binding ← e.variable-binding ∪ {(u, context-user)}
e′.function-library ← e.function-library ∪ { sec-inview, sec-id, sec-string,
sec-sum, sec-string-length, sec-normalize-space, sec-numeric-add,
sec-numeric-subtract, sec-numeric-multiply, sec-numeric-divide,
sec-numeric-integer-divide, sec-numeric-mod, sec-numeric-unary-plus,
sec-numeric-unary-minus, sec-eq, sec-neq, sec-lt, sec-number,




1. Locate every occurrence of clause Axis::NodeTest in qu, and insert a predi-
cate [sec-inview()] immediately after each occurrence.
2. Replace every occurrence of insecure XPath functions in query qu with its
corresponding secure function, according to Table 3.2.
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3. Replace every occurrence of insecure XPath operators in the query qu with
its corresponding secure function, according to Table 3.3.
For example, given a query qu that returns the postcodes of all employees, like
/descendant::employee/descendant::postcode
the query rewriting function will rewrite it to q′u as
/descendant::employee[sec-inview()]
/descendant::postcode[sec-inview()]
Similarly, a more complicated expression that returns the name of male employees
whose total income is greater than 100,000, like
/descendant::employee
[attribute::gender="male"]
[descendant::salary + descendant::bonus >= 100000]
/descendant::name






6Since we require that the access control policy to be enforced must be valid, some of the
inserted predicates are actually unnecessary. We leave the optimization of rewritten queries for
future study.
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Context Rewriting Part
Recall that a path expression is always evaluated within a context, and a context can
be modeled as a 6-tuple like 〈context-node, context-position, context-size, variable-
bindings, function-library, namespace-decl〉, in which the function-library consists
of a mapping from function names to function definitions and the variable-bindings
consists of a mapping from variable names to variable values.
In the previous sections, we have shown that the query rewriting function
rewrites a path expression by inserting the predicate [sec-inview()] and by re-
placing insecure functions and operators with their equivalent security functions.
Since the security functions are defined by the query modification algorithm, they
are not included in the function library of the initial context. Consequently, a
standard XPath evaluator has no idea how to process these security functions. In
addition, to process a security function, e.g., the sec-inview(), the XPath opera-
tor has to know who is the context user. This information, again, is not available in
the initial context. In order to enable an XPath evaluator to evaluate the rewritten
expressions, we have to add the missing information into the initial context.
The pseudocode in Figure 3.7 shows the definition of the rewritten context e′.
The context e′ is a superset of e. Besides the elements in e, e′ also includes a
variable u which is bound to the context user, and a name-definition mapping for
the security functions.
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3.4 The Overview of the Correctness Proof of the
Query Modification Algorithm
In this section we give a overview of the correctness proof of the query modification
algorithm. The complete proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 Let D be an XML database, D′ur be a valid read accessibility view (on
D) for user u, and qu be an arbitrary XPath expression posted by u under context




such that the result of evaluating qu against D
′
ur under context e is equal to the
result of evaluating q′u against D under e
′.
The objective of this proof is to show that the above theorem is true. The whole
proof idea is founded on one concept—the expression level. The XPath grammar
shows that there is a level structure in path expressions. For example, a complex
XPath expression can be conceived as an expression that applies operations7 to less
complex expressions; a less complex expression, in turn, can be conceived as an
expression that applies operations to even simpler expressions, and so on. The pro-
cess continues until it reaches the atomic expressions—the simplest expressions that
cannot be further decomposed. Based on this observation, we define the concept
of expression level as follows.
Definition 5 (Expression Level) Every XPath expression has its expression
level. Atomic expressions are expressions of level 1. An expression is of level k
7We use the term “operation” in a generic sense to refer to not only the standard logical,
numeric and comparison operations, but also the function calls and path navigations.
CHAPTER 3. SECURE QUERY EVALUATION 46
if it has at least one immediate sub-expression of level k − 1 and no immediate
sub-expression of level k or greater.
The level structure of an expression can be visualized as a tree, in which the
internal nodes represent operators and the leaves represent atomic expressions. The
number of steps of the longest path from the root to leaves represents the level of
that expression. A k-level path expression, for instance, can be visualized as a tree
of height k, in which the root represents the operation to be applied—e.g., a function
call or a logical and operation—and the subtrees represent the sub-expressions on
which the operation is to be applied. If we use L(XPath) to denote the set of all










In the previous section, we have proposed a query modification algorithm for the se-
cure evaluation of XPath expressions. Given an XPath expression, the query modifi-
cation algorithm will rewrite it into a secure expression containing the sec-inview()
function. Each evaluation of the sec-inview() involves an authorization decision,
for a specific user and object, on the basis of the access control policies. There-
fore, the performance of the decision making mechanism, the one that performs the
evaluation of sec-inview(), largely impacts the speed of secure query evaluation.
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, in discretionary access controls where the access
control policies are specified in terms of authorizations, the interactions between
authorizations may become extremely complex. Therefore determining a user’s
privilege directly from access control policies may be slow. A possible solution to
fast decision making is to materialize the access matrix. In this case, a decision
47
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making mechanism can answer authorization inquiries by looking up the answers in
the materialized access matrix, without computing them from policies. However,
in the context of XML databases in which access controls can be specified at the
granularity of individual elements or attributes, the space cost of the matrix mate-
rialization becomes a serious issue. Storing the matrix as a two-dimensional array
is obviously not efficient. How to record the access matrix compactly is therefore
the problem we are going to explore in this chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we review a few conventional
implementations of the access matrix. In Section 4.2, we introduce the Compressed
Accessibility Map (CAM), a solution recently proposed by Jagadish and his col-
leagues to the same problem. We describe our codebook method in Section 4.3,
and evaluate its space efficiency in Section 4.4.
4.1 Access Control Lists, Capability Lists and
Authorization Relations
Access control lists and capability lists, commonly used in operating systems, are
two popular implementations of access matrices. Both approaches are based on one
observation: as an access matrix is usually large and sparse, i.e., most matrix entries
are empty, storing only non-empty matrix entries will achieve good compression.
Under the access control list approach, an access matrix is stored by columns.
That is, every object in the matrix is associated with a list of 〈user, access-mode〉
pairs, called an access control list, indicating the users and the corresponding access
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modes granted on that object. Consider, for example, the access matrix in Table
2.1. The access control list of object o1 consists of 〈s1, read〉, 〈s1, write〉, and
〈s4, read〉. Likewise, the access control list of object o2 consists of 〈s2, read〉,
〈s2, write〉, and 〈s3, read〉. This implementation makes object-centric operations
easy to perform. Operations such as determining all of the users who have access
to a specific object or revoking all access to a given object can be easily performed
by examining or deleting the access control list of the object in question. However,
it complicates subject-centric operations. Revoking all of the access privileges of a
given user, for instance, requires a review of all access control lists.
Under the capability list approach, an access matrix is stored by rows. Every
subject in the matrix is associated with a list 〈object, access-mode〉, called a ca-
pability list, indicating the objects and the access modes for which the subject is
authorized. For example, the capability list of user s1 in Table 2.1 has two pairs:
〈o1, read〉 and 〈o1, write〉. The capability list of user s2 has six pairs: 〈o2,
read〉, 〈o2, write〉, 〈o4, read〉, 〈o4, write〉, 〈o5, read〉, and 〈o5, write〉. In
contrast to access control lists, capability lists make subject-centric operations easy
and object-centric operations hard. For example, it is easy to determine, for a given
user, all of the objects the user is authorized to access, but difficult to determine
all of the users who have privilege to access a specific object.
An authorization relation, or authorization table, is another popular represen-
tation of the access matrix [28]. The table shown in Table 4.1 is an authorization
relation for the access matrix in Table 2.1. Each row in the table represents one
authorization. If the table is sorted by users, as shown in this example, we get the
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effect of capability lists. If the table is sorted by object, we get the effect of access
control lists. This representation is commonly used in relational databases.
















Table 4.1: Authorization Relation
The aforementioned three techniques are proven successful in operating systems
and relational databases. However, as we mentioned, they are not good enough for
fine-grained XML access control.
4.2 Compressed Accessibility Map
The Compressed Accessibility Map (CAM) is a solution proposed by Jagadish and
his colleagues to the problem of the compact representation of an access matrix
[20]. The compression of CAM is achieved by exploiting the structural locality of
accessibility in hierarchical data.
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Recall that a labeled XML tree records a user’s privileges in a specific access
mode. As has just been described, one way to record a user’s privileges in a specific
access mode is to maintain, for that user, a capability list containing all of the
objects the user is authorized to access in the given mode. This capability list,
however, is redundant. Jagadish and his colleagues observed that the accessibility in
hierarchical data, e.g., in XML documents, exhibits strong structural locality. That
is, in a user’s labeled XML tree, the accessible nodes (or inaccessible nodes) tend
to cluster together. Therefore, instead of explicitly keeping a list of all accessible
objects, they record a labeled XML tree more compactly as a CAM tree. The
CAM tree only keeps some crucial nodes in a labeled XML tree, as well as some
additional information. From the crucial nodes and the additional information,
the system can efficiently infer a user’s privilege on any objects. A CAM tree is
a compact representation of a labeled XML tree. To record the complete access
control information, a system should maintain one CAM tree for each user and
access mode.
Jagadish and his colleagues developed algorithms to construct an optimal (min-
imum size) CAM tree for a given user and access mode, and devised an algorithm
for efficient lookup. The general idea of the CAM tree construction and lookup is
illustrated in the following example. Figure 4.1(a) is a labeled XML tree, where
square nodes are accessible and round nodes are not. Its corresponding CAM tree
is shown in Figure 4.1(b). Each node in a CAM tree has a label. The semantics
of the labels is defined as follows: if node x carries a label s+ (or s-), then node x
itself is accessible (or inaccessible); if node x carries a label d+ (or d-) and node x
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is node y’s closest labeled ancestor, then node y is accessible (or inaccessible). For
example, node B can be inferred to be accessible because of its own s+ label. Node
U, however, should be inferred to be inaccessible, as its nearest labeled ancestor
(the node J) has a d- label.
A















Figure 4.1: Compression Accessibility Map (CAM)
4.3 Codebook Based Scheme
Both the capability lists and the CAM record access control information on a per-
subject basis. Their difference lies in the representation of capabilities. In the
former approach, a user’s capability is represented by a collection of lists, whereas
in the latter approach it is represented by a collection of CAM trees. A CAM tree
is usually more efficient, as it eliminates the redundancy of a capability list which is
caused by the so called structural locality of accessibility. This observation raises a
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question: can similar improvements be made to access control lists? After all, most
operating systems use access control lists, rather than capability lists.1 The answer
to this question leads to the development of a new compact representation of the
access matrix which we are going to present in this and the following sections.
4.3.1 Vector Based Scheme
Suppose, initially, a system has just one access mode. The access cube is then a
|O| × |U | 2-dimensional matrix, where O is the set of objects and U is the set of
users. In this matrix, every object is associated with a |U |-bit 0-1 vector. Such a
vector is called an access control vector, for it records the accessibility pattern of
that object. Theoretically, each object may have a distinct access control vector; a
system with |O| objects and |U | users may have min(|O|, 2|U |) distinct access con-
trol vectors, which is potentially enormous. However, considering the hierarchical
structure of XML data and the propagative behaviors of access control policies, it is
reasonable to conjecture that objects closely positioned in an XML hierarchy may
share an identical accessibility pattern, and hence the actual number of distinct ac-
cess control vectors may be much less than the theoretical value. This hypothesis,
in fact, is the basis of our method. It will be experimentally validated in the next
section. For the time being, we continue the description of our method, assuming
that the hypothesis is true.
According to the hypothesis, the actual number of distinct access control vectors
in an XML database should be small. Thus, we store the access matrix in two
1This is presumably because object-centric operations happen more frequently in operation
systems and access control lists can handle object-centric operations gracefully.
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parts: an in-memory part and an on-disk part. The in-memory part is an array
that contains one copy of each distinct access control vector. We call this array
the access control codebook. The on-disk part maintains an index for each object.
This index, which points to an entry in the access control codebook, identifies the
proper access control vector for that object. We call these indexes access control
codes. The on-disk part can be implemented as a table, in which case the access
control information is kept completely separate from the database objects, or it can
be implemented by co-locating the indexes with the objects. In order to track the
usage of access control vectors, we maintain a reference counter for each vector in
the codebook, showing the number of objects currently sharing this vector. Figure
4.2 illustrates the above two implementation choices for the read slice of the access
cube A′ shown in Table 2.2.
S1   S2   S3   S4   
1    0    0    1
0    1    1    0
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Figure 4.2: Codebook Implementation Schemes
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Under this scheme, authorization decision lookup is efficient. Since the access
control codebook is supposed to be in memory, the primary cost of a lookup oper-
ation is the time of locating the object to be accessed. Once the object is found,
we can easily follow the access control code to get the access control vector, and
determine the user’s accessibility accordingly. If the object in question has been
prefetched into memory, which is common in practice, a lookup operation can be
performed without accessing secondary storage. Object updates are trivial. Ob-
jects can be added into or removed from a database directly, probably with a few
minor changes to the codebook. Authorization updates are simple, too. Suppose
we want to change an object’s access control vector from v1 to v2. We first search
the codebook for vector v2. If v2 exists, we simply assign the code of v2 to that
object; otherwise, we insert v2 into the codebook first, and then assign its code to
that object. When the reference counter of an access control vector hits zero, the
vector becomes inactive. The system can either eliminate inactive vectors eagerly
or clean them up periodically. Subject updates are relatively complex. Adding a
new user, or deleting an existing user, may result in a dimensional change of the
codebook. Changing a user’s privileges on a set of objects, in the worst case, may
result in a code change on every object in that set.
The extra complexity related to subject updates is predictable, because our
method, as a variation of access control lists, inherently favors object-centric oper-
ations over subject-centric operations. We believe that efficient support for object-
centric operations is critical for systems in which object-centric operations appear
more frequently than subject-centric operations. In addition, implementing the
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codebook as a 2-dimensional array, as demonstrated in this thesis, is just a ba-
sic approach. We believe that in some circumstances a more efficient codebook
implementation scheme can be developed, and the complexity of subject-centric
operations can be reduced. The efficient management of the codebook, however, is
not a focus of this thesis. We leave it for future study.
4.3.2 Slab Based Scheme
If a system has multiple access modes, say |M |, we have two choices. First, we can
view the |U | × |O| × |M | 3-dimensional access cube as a stack of |O| independent
slabs; each slab is a |U | × |M | 2-dimensional matrix, holding the complete access
control information for a specific object. Following this perspective, we continue
to record one code for every object; but the entries of codebook are “slabs” of
size |U | × |M |. Alternatively, we can view the 3-dimensional cube as |O| × |M | 1-
dimensional vectors; each vector has |U | bits, recording the complete access control
information for a specific object and access mode. In this case, the entries of
codebook are still vectors of size |U |; but for each object, we have to maintain |M |
codes, one for each access mode.
Suppose R denotes the size of one access control code, C denotes the size of
the reference counter, Vl denotes the number of distinct access control slabs, and
Vc denotes the number of distinct access control vectors. The space cost of the
slab approach and the vector approach can be calculated by formulas 4.1 and 4.2
respectively.
SIZEslab = |O| × R︸ ︷︷ ︸
on disk
+ Vl × (|M | × |U | + C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
in memory
(4.1)
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SIZEvector = |O| × |M | × R︸ ︷︷ ︸
on disk
+ Vc × (|U | + C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
in memory
(4.2)
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Since |O| is usually much
greater than |U | and |M |, the overall space cost is likely to be dominated by the
cost of the on-disk part. Comparing with the vector approach, the slab approach
has less overall space cost, as it has a smaller on-disk part; but it requires more
memory.
4.4 Experiment
The experiment has three objectives: (1) to verify the hypothesis, (2) to understand
the frequency distribution of access control vectors, and (3) to evaluate the space
efficiency of the codebook storage scheme.
4.4.1 Hypothesis Verification
The compression of our method is achieved on the basis of one hypothesis. That is,
in most systems, the number of distinct access control vectors (or slabs) is small.
In this subsection, we verify this hypothesis with experiments.
Since we could not find examples of production XML databases with fine-grained
access controls, we conducted experiments on three similar kinds of data sets. The
first consists of access control information from a shared Unix file system at the
University of Waterloo. The second consists of access control information from a
production instance of Open Text LiveLink, a hierarchical system that provides
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Web-based knowledge management services for corporations. The third consists of
access control information from a collection of 50 Unix file systems. These 50 Unix
file systems were randomly selected from a larger collection of 433 Unix file systems
collected by Jagadish and his colleagues for the purpose of CAM evaluation. For
each of these three data sets, we count the number of distinct access control vectors
for each access mode, and the total number of distinct access control vectors across
all of the access modes. For each of the 50 Unix file systems in the third data set,
we also count the number of distinct access control slabs.
Waterloo File System
The first data set, collected at the University of Waterloo, describes access
controls for a shared Unix file system with 186 users and 1,541,759 files2. It
supports three access modes: read, write, and execute. The 186 users be-
long to 60 groups. The group membership information is specified in the
file /etc/group, and a file’s access control information is specified by a 9-
character permission code, like rwxrwxrwx. We interpret the group member-
ship information and permission codes with the standard Unix access control
semantics to determine a user’s access privilege.
The experiment was conducted in two steps. First, for each file in the file
system, we calculate three access control vectors, one for each access mode,
and partition them into three different result sets. An access control vector
is a 186-bit 0-1 vector, one bit per user, in which bit i is set to 1 if the
2We use the term file in a broad sense to refer to any valid entity in a Unix file system, e.g., a
file, a directory, or a symbolic link, etc.
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corresponding user is allowed to access that file in the appropriate access
mode. Then, we count the number of distinct vectors for each of the three
result sets, and the total number of distinct vectors for the union of the above
three result sets, respectively. Table 4.2 summarizes the experimental results.
Distinct Access
Mode Objects Users Control Vectors
read 1,541,759 186 250
write 1,541,759 186 278
execute 1,541,759 186 252
combined 1,541,759 186 564
Table 4.2: Access Control Vector Analysis for Waterloo Data
A system like this, in the worst case, may have 1,541,759 distinct access
control vectors, i.e., each object may hold one distinct access control vector.
However, Table 4.2 shows that the actual number of distinct access control
vectors is remarkably small: 250 in read mode, 278 in write mode, and 252
in execute mode. In total, we have only 564 distinct access control vectors
across three access modes, as shown in the “combined” mode.
LiveLink System
As the time of our data capture, the LiveLink system had 371,549 objects,
1,582 users, 7,057 groups and 10 access modes. The LiveLink system has a
much more sophisticated subject hierarchy. Unlike the Unix system, in which
a group contains only users, a group in the LiveLink system may contain other
groups. Authorizations specified on a group always propagate down to its
members. Table 4.3 shows the experimental results for the LiveLink system.
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Again, the number of distinct access control vectors for each individual access
mode is small, a little more than 4,000 in most cases. The number of distinct
access control vectors across access modes, as shown in the “combined” mode,
is also small—less than 10,000. It is easy to see that the number of distinct
access control vectors in the “combined” mode is much less than the sum
of the number of distinct vectors in each individual access mode. This fact
indicates that there are considerable amount of duplicates among the sets of
distinct access control vectors of each individual access mode.
Distinct Access
Mode Objects Users Control Vectors
checkout 371,549 1,582 4,235
creat node 371,549 1,582 3,926
delete 371,549 1,582 5,591
delete ver 371,549 1,582 4,273
edit attr 371,549 1,582 4,144
edit 371,549 1,582 4,362
modify 371,549 1,582 4,684
rm node 371,549 1,582 22
see content 371,549 1,582 4,325
see 371,549 1,582 4,198
combined 371,549 1,582 9,863
Table 4.3: Access Control Vector Analysis for LiveLink Data
CAM Data
In order to evaluate the space efficiency of CAM, Jagadish and his colleagues
collected access control information from 433 Unix file systems. We randomly
selected 50 file systems from those 433 systems for further study. For each
of the 50 file systems, we counted (1) the number of distinct access control
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vectors for each individual access mode, (2) the number of distinct access
control vectors across all access modes, and (3) the number of distinct access
control slabs.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 4.3 on page 62. Three of the
plots show the number of access control vectors versus the number of users,
for read, write, and execute. Two show the number of distinct access control
vectors and access control slabs across all access modes versus the number
of users. The numbers of distinct access control vectors in those 50 file sys-
tems are consistently small. The maximum number of distinct access control
vectors (across all access modes) in any file systems is just a little more than
200. About 90% of the systems have less than 100 distinct access control
vectors. And, as we conjectured, the number of distinct slabs is greater than
the number of distinct access control vectors.
Our experiments on three different data sets all verified the hypothesis. Al-
though these three data sets are not XML data, they are well-defined hierarchical
data. It is reasonable for us to conjecture that the same property also exists in
XML data.
4.4.2 Frequency Distribution of Access Control Vectors
Our experiments also reveal that the frequency distribution of the access control
vectors in some large hierarchical data loosely follows Zipf’s law. Zipf’s law, named
after the Harvard linguistic professor George Kingsley Zipf, is the observation that
frequency of occurrence of some event (P ), as a function of the rank (i) when the



























































































































































Figure 4.3: Access Control Vector Analysis for CAM Data
rank is determined by the above frequency of occurrence, is a power-law function
Pi ∼ 1/iα where α is a constant parameter close to unity [33]. Plotted onto a





























LiveLink access control vector rank (log scale)
Figure 4.4: Frequency Distribution of Access Control Vectors in LiveLink Data
double-logarithm diagram, the curve of Zipf’s distribution function is a descending
straight line with a slope close to −1.
Figure 4.4 shows the frequency distribution of the “combined” access control
vectors in the LiveLink system. We sort all of the distinct access control vectors in
the “combined” mode in descending order by the number of their occurrences. An
access control vector of rank 1 is the vector that appears most frequently, an access
control vector of rank 2 is the one that appears second most frequently, and so on.
Each spot in the diagram represents one distinct access control vector; its x-value
represents the rank of the access control vector, and its y-value shows the number
of occurrences. The curve shown in Figure 4.4, a descending straight line with a
minor deviation at the low end, demonstrates that the frequency distribution of the
access control vectors in the LiveLink system loosely follows Zipf’s law.
We do not yet know whether it is a property existing in all hierarchical data;
but, we know that it does exist in some large ones. Zipf’s law says that access
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control vectors do not appear at the same rate. There are always a few vectors that
appear a lot of times and many vectors that appear only a few times. A possible
application of this property is that, if the codebook is too big to fit in memory, we
can cache a small portion of the codebook and still get a good hit ratio. We leave
the verification of this property and its possible applications for future study.
4.4.3 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the newly proposed codebook
scheme from two perspectives. First, we compare the performance of the two differ-
ent implementation approaches: the access control vector approach and the access
control slab approach. Second, we compare, for each of the 50 file systems, the space
costs of the codebook scheme (implemented in the access control slab approach)
with that of two other techniques: the access control list and the CAM.
Vectors Versus Slabs
Recall that the total space cost of the codebook scheme includes two parts: the
on-disk part occupied by the access control codes and the in-memory part occupied
by the access control codebook. A codebook can be implemented either as an array
of access control vectors or as an array of access control slabs. The space cost of
the slab approach and the vector approach can be calculated by formulas 4.1 and
4.2 respectively.
In the following experiments, we assume that each access control code occupies
16 bits, which is sufficient to index 65,536 distinct access control vectors (or slabs).
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For each of the 50 file systems in the CAM data set, we calculate its in-memory
space cost and total space cost under the two different implementation approaches.
Figure 4.5 shows the comparison between the total space costs of the two imple-
mentation approaches. The first diagram shows the results for the first 25 files and
the second diagram shows the results for the remaining 25 files. Figure 4.6 shows
the comparison between in-memory space cost (the size of the codebook) of the two
implementation approaches. As predicated, the slab approach uses less total space
than the vector approach. However, the slab approach requires more space in main
memory.
Comparisons between ACL, CAM and Codebook
Under the access control list approach, every object maintains |M | access control
lists, one for each access mode. We assume that an access control list consists of a
list of 〈user-id, pointer〉 pairs, where the user-id is a 16-bit user identifier and the
pointer is a 32-bit address pointing to the next pair in the list. That is, each pair
occupies 48 bits. The space cost of one access control list equals the number of
pairs (in the list) times the size of the pair (48 bits); and, the total space cost of
the access control list scheme is the sum of the sizes of all access control lists over
all of the objects, which can be calculated by the following formula:




where O is a set of objects, M is a set of access modes, and |ACLij| is the number
of pairs in the access control list associated with object i and access mode j.
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Under the CAM approach, the system maintains |M | CAM trees for each user,
one for each access mode. In a system with |U | users, the total number of CAM
trees is |M | × |U |. The total space cost of the CAM scheme is the sum of the sizes





where U is a set of users, M is a set of access modes, and |CAMij| is the size of the
CAM tree for user i and access mode j.
The space cost of a specific CAM tree, say CAMi,j, can be calculated by multi-
plying the number of labeled nodes (in CAMi,j) with the size of a labeled node. We
assume that each labeled node occupies 131 bits. This assumption is in accordance
with Jagadish’s suggestion. Thus, the total of the CAM scheme can be expressed
by the following formula:




where NCAMij is the number of labeled nodes in CAMij. In this experiment, the
number of labeled nodes in CAM trees, i.e., the NCAMij , was provided by Jagadish
and his colleagues.
Figure 4.7 shows the experimental results. The comparison reveals that our
codebook scheme is very space efficient. In most case, its space cost is less than
10% of that of the CAMs.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Total Space Cost Comparison between ACV and SLAB






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.6: In-Memory Space Cost Comparison between ACV and SLAB



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.7: Space Cost Comparison between ACL, CAM and Codebook
Chapter 5
Related Work
Research on access controls can be traced back to the 1960s. At that time, the bulk
of the research laid in the development of mathematical models for access controls.
The goal was to find a simple high-level conceptual model to help researchers better
understand the structure and the behavior of an access control system and provide
researchers a tool for proving the correctness of an access control system. Of the
large number of access control models that were proposed, the Lampson model [24],
the Graham and Denning model [17], and the Harrision model [19] are milestones
for discretionary access controls; the Bell and LaPadula model [1], the Dion model
[11], and the Sea View model [14] are milestones for mandatory access controls.
With the emergence of object oriented databases, researchers began to consider
how to apply traditional access control models to protect this new data format.
As data items in object oriented databases usually have richer semantics and more
complex correlations, traditional access control models were extended to meet the
new requirements. Some representative efforts include the ORION model [26, 12]
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which is an extension to the discretionary model, and the Meadows model [5] which
is an extension to the mandatory model.1
Recent research on access controls focuses primarily on three areas. One is
the design and the implementation of role based access control models2 [15, 27].
Another is the development of the unified access control systems which is able to
specify and enforce multiple access control policies [4, 21, 22]. The third active area
is access controls for XML, which is also the focus of this work. In the remainder
of this chapter, we explore four research efforts related to XML access controls: (1)
the Damiani model, (2) the Bertino model, (3) the Kudo model, and (4) the opti-
mization of the secure evaluation of twig queries. Since CAM has been introduced
in Chapter 4, we will not discuss it here.
5.1 Models Proposed by Damiani and Bertino
Damiani et al. [10, 8, 9] and Bertino et al. [3, 13, 2] each independently proposed a
fine-grained access control model for XML. The structures of the models are fairly
similar: both of them are extensions to the traditional discretionary access control
models; both of them express access control requirements in XML syntax; both
of them define the semantics of access controls as a particular view on the XML
document; and both of them create the view by means of tree labeling and pruning.
Their difference lies in the details of designs, e.g., how to model a subject, how to
propagate authorizations, and so on. Here, we use Damiani’s model as an example
1Castano, Fugini and Samarati provide a complete description of access control models [6].
2Some latest information about RBAC can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/rbac/.
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to introduce the major concepts of the models.
In Damiani’s model, each XML/DTD document is associated with one au-
thorization sheet. An authorization sheet is a well-formed XML document that
contains the authorization rules related to the document to be protected. Each
authorization rule is a 5-tuple 〈subject, object, action, sign, type〉, where:
Subject is the entity that requests access to the system.
Object is the resource to be protected. The object granularity on which access
controls can be specified spans from the DTD level to the element level, or
even down to the attribute level.
Action is the access mode. The model, at the time of its writing, supports the
read operation only, but it can be extended to incorporate other access modes.
Sign could be a “+” or a “-”, indicating whether the authorization rule is positive
or negative. A positive authorization states the situations in which access
should be authorized, whereas a negative authorization states the situations
in which access should be forbidden.
Type specifies the propagation option of the authorization. The model defines
eight propagation options, each of which derives implicit authorizations in a
different manner. For example, a “recursive” authorization specified on an
element will derive implicit authorizations for its subelements and attributes,
whereas a “local” authorization will derive implicit authorizations for its at-
tributes only.
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The semantics of access control for a user is defined as a view of the document,
namely the user’s accessibility view, which contains only the data that the user is
authorized to access. Damiani and his colleagues devised an algorithm to compute
the view by means of tree labeling and pruning. In the tree labeling process, the
algorithm traverses the document tree from the root, decides for each node whether
the user is authorized to access that node, and marks the node accordingly. The
result of the labeling process is a labeled document tree in which every node is
marked either “accessible” or “inaccessible.” The pruning process is then applied
on the labeled document tree to generate the user’s accessibility view by pruning
off all of the “inaccessible” nodes.3
The emphasis in this work is on the design of the XML access control model,
focusing on addressing some high level problems related to XML access controls,
such as: how to specify access control requirements, how to derive authorization
decisions, and how to enforce access controls, with little attention to the efficiency
of the access control mechanism.
5.2 XACL
While almost all of the existing access control models assume that a system either
authorizes or denies an access request, Kudo and his colleagues proposed a pro-
visional access control model that can provide more sophisticated access controls
[18, 23].
3In order to preserve the document structure, the pruning process will keep an inaccessible
element, if it has accessible descendants.
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A provisional access control model adds extended semantics to traditional ac-
cess control models. Instead of simply authorizing or denying a user’s request, a
provisional access control model is able to make a more flexible decision, e.g., telling
a user that his request will be authorized if he (and/or the system) takes certain
security actions prior to the authorization, say signing an agreement of terms and
conditions. The provisional access control model is shown to be useful in many
e-commerce applications, e.g., online auctions or online contracting, which require
conditional authorizations.
Kudo also proposed an XML access control language (XACL), on the basis
of the provisional authorization model, which allows the security administrators to
write flexible access control requirements in XML syntax. An implementation of an
XACL processor is available as a part of XML Security Suite, which is downloadable
at IBM’s alphaWorks website4.
5.3 Optimizing the Secure Evaluation of Twig
Queries
Cho and colleagues proposed techniques for optimizing the secure evaluation of
twig queries in a multi-level security model [7]. The semantics of secure query
evaluation of twig queries used in this work was introduced in Chapter 3. In their
model, security levels are specified as attributes at the granularity of XML elements,
but not every element has a security attribute. For an element without a specified
4The XML Security Suite is available at http://www.alphaworks.ibm.com/tech/xmlsecuritysuite/
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security attribute, its security level is inherited from its nearest ancestor with a
specified security level. Users can only access the elements whose security levels
are no higher than theirs.
The first contribution of this work is showing that a twig query can be se-
curely evaluated, in a multi-level security model, by means of query rewriting. The
essence of the query rewriting is to append additional security check predicates to
the original twig query. The security check predicate determines whether a user is
authorized to access a particular object, i.e., whether the user’s security level domi-
nates the object’s security level. For an element that inherits its security level from
its ancestors, such a security check requires a recursive computation to identify the
security level of the element’s nearest ancestor. Since such a recursive computation
is usually expensive, the second contribution of the work is developing a query op-
timization algorithm that can eliminate unnecessary access control predicates from
the rewritten queries by exploiting the security constraints specified in the schemas.
Our work differs from Cho’s work in several respects. First, we consider the
secure evaluation of XPath expressions, a query language that has more operators
than twig queries. Second, unlike Cho’s work, which is based on a binding based
semantics, our work is based on a view based semantics which is independent of
query languages. Third, we also consider the problem of space efficient representa-




The first part of this thesis addressed the problem of secure evaluation of XPath
expressions. We started with the introduction of a language-independent seman-
tics for secure query evaluation. Based on this semantics, we proposed a query
modification algorithm for the secure evaluation of path expressions. Given a path
expression, the query modification algorithm rewrites it into a secure expression
whose evaluation uses and returns only the data the query issuer is authorized to
access. The correctness of this algorithm was proved under our semantics of secure
query evaluation.
The second part of the thesis addressed the problem of the compact representa-
tion of access matrices, which is critical to making efficient authorization decisions.
Our experimental study shows that the access matrices, although large, are very
redundant. By exploiting the redundancy, we developed a codebook scheme for
the compact storage of access matrices. The codebook scheme exhibits substantial
space savings over other storage schemes, such as the access control lists and the
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CAM. Savings are more than 90% in most cases.
These two techniques, combined together, provide a foundation for the efficient
enforcement of fine-grained access control for query-based access to XML databases.
6.1 Future Work
Our work is only an initial step toward the establishment of secure XML databases.
There are many issues that we plan to investigate. One immediate problem we want
to explore is the dynamic maintenance of the codebook. The codebook storage
scheme favors object-centric operations over subject-centric operations. Ideally, we
should develop a structure for the codebook that can adapt to the changes in the
subject hierarchy gracefully. Another problem we want to explore is how to combine
the best features of CAM and our codebook scheme. Currently, we maintain one
access control code for every object in the database. As an alternative, we can
maintain a CAM tree for the access control codes. This will not only save space,




The XPath query modification algorithm is composed of two parts: a query rewrit-
ing function and a collection of security functions. The query rewriting function is
the heart of the modification algorithm—it defines how a query should be modified;
the security functions, on the other hand, are supporting functions defined in the
query modification algorithm to perform security-related activities.
A.1 Definition of Query Rewriting Function
The query rewriting function is a function that takes two arguments—an XPath
expression qu posted by user u (the context user) and an initial evaluation context
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e′.variable-binding ← e.variable-binding ∪ {(u, context-user)}
e′.function-library ← e.function-library ∪ { sec-inview, sec-id, sec-string,
sec-sum, sec-string-length, sec-normalize-space, sec-numeric-add,
sec-numeric-subtract, sec-numeric-multiply, sec-numeric-divide,
sec-numeric-integer-divide, sec-numeric-mod, sec-numeric-unary-plus,
sec-numeric-unary-minus, sec-eq, sec-neq, sec-lt, sec-number,
sec-gt, sec-le, sec-ge, sec-string-value }
The rewritten context e′ is a superset of the context e. Besides the elements
in e, context e′ also includes a variable u which is bound to the context user,
and a name-definition mapping for the security functions.
Query Rewriting
Given a path expression qu posed by user u, the query rewriting function
rewrites it to q′u. Since the query rewriting is highly related to the structure
of path expressions, we define it in terms of a yacc specification [25].
The yacc specification in Figure A.1 is the main body of the definition of
the query rewriting. It consists of a collection of grammar rules that are
taken from the grammar of XPath specification version 1.0. For each of the
grammar rules, we specify an action which will be performed at each time the
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rule is recognized. For example, the third and fourth lines in the specification
show that the following grammar rule
EqualityExpr ::= EqualityExpr ’=’ RelationalExpr.
is associated with the action
$$ = "sec-eq( $1, $3 )"
That means, if this rule is recognized, the string sec-eq( $1, $3 ) will be
returned, where $1 and $3 are pseudo-variables that should be replaced by the
values of the nonterminal EqualityExpr and RelationalExpr on the right
side of the grammar rule.
It is worth mentioning that the specification in Figure A.1 is not complete.
Many XPath grammar rules are not included. For the sake of simplicity, we
omit the grammar rules that are not subject to rewriting. To get a complete
definition, one needs to add those missing rules back into this specification,
and specify, for each of those missing rules, one action that assigns the con-
catenation of the values of the symbols on the right hand side of the rule to
the symbol on the left hand side.
A.2 Definitions of Security Functions
Security functions are supporting functions defined in the query modification al-
gorithm to perform security-related activities. Table 3.1 shows all of the security
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functions defined by the XPath query modification algorithm. Table 3.2 shows the
mapping from the insecure functions to their corresponding secure functions. Table
3.3 shows the mapping from the insecure operators to their corresponding secure
functions. We give the definitions of the security functions in this section.
Function: boolean sec-inview()
Given the evaluation context e and the access cube A, sec-inview() returns
true if, and only if, A[e.u, e.cn, r] = 1, where r refers to the read mode, e.u
and e.cn refer to the context user and the context node respectively.
Function: string sec-string(object? )
The sec-string() function returns the secure string value of an object.
1. If the argument is omitted, it defaults to a node set with the context
node as its only member.
2. If the object is an empty node set, an empty string is returned.
3. If the object is a non-empty node set that contains at least one accessible
node, the secure string value of the first node (in document order) in the
node set is returned, as if by a call to the sec-string-value() function.
If the object is a non-empty node that does not contain an accessible
node, an empty string is returned.
4. If the argument object is of other data types, the string value of object
is returned as if by a call to the standard string() function.
Function: string sec-string-value(nodeset )
The sec-string-value() function returns the secure string value of the argu-
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ment node set. The argument is always a node-set that contains one accessible
node.
1. If the node in the argument nodeset is a root node, the concatenation
of the string values of all accessible text node descendants (in document
order) of the root node is returned.
2. If the node in the argument nodeset is an element node, the concate-
nation of the string values of all accessible text node descendants (in
document order) of the element node is returned.
3. If the node in the argument nodeset is of other Node types, e.g., an
attribute node, a namespace node, a processing instruction node, a com-
ment node, or a text node, its standard string value is returned, as if by
a call to the standard string() function.
Function: node-set sec-id(object )
The sec-id() function selects elements by their unique IDs.
1. If the argument is a node set, the result is computed in the following
two steps: (1) union the node sets generated by applying the standard
id() function to the secure string value of each node in the argument
node set; The secure string value of a node is computed as if by a call
to the sec-string(). (2) return the accessible nodes in the union.
2. If the argument is an object of any other type, the result is computed in
the following two step: (1) generate a node set by applying the standard
id() function to the string value of that argument object ; The string
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value is computed as if by a call to the standard string() function. (2)
return the accessible nodes in the node set generated by the previous
step.
Function: number sec-number(object? )
The sec-number() function converts its argument to a number as follows.
1. If the argument is omitted, it defaults to a node-set with the context
node as its only member.
2. If the argument is a node set, the result is a number returned by ap-
plying the standard number() function to the secure string value of the
argument. The secure string value is produced as if by a call to the
sec-string() function.
3. If the argument is an object of other data types, the result is a number
returned by applying the standard number() function to that argument.
Function: number sec-sum(node-set )
The sec-sum() converts each node in the argument node set into a number
by calling the sec-number() function and returns the sum.
Function: number sec-string-length(string? )
If the argument is omitted, it defaults to the secure string value of the context
node. The secure value of the context node is produced as if by a call to the
sec-string() function.
Otherwise, the sec-string-length() returns the number of characters in
the string value of the argument by calling the standard string-length()
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function.
Function: number sec-normalize-space(string? )
If the argument is omitted, it defaults to the secure string value of the context
node. The secure value of the context node is produced as if by a call to the
sec-string() function.
Otherwise, the sec-normalize-space() returns the normalized string of the
argument by calling the standard normalize-space() function.
Secure Functions for Comparison Operators
XPath 1.0 defines six comparison operators which include =, !=, <=, <, >= and
>. Their corresponding secure functions are: sec-eq(), sec-ne(), sec-le(),
sec-lt(), sec-ge() and sec-gt(). The semantics of these comparison se-
curity functions is the same as that of those standard comparison operators,
except that the standard comparison operators convert operants into numbers
or strings by calling the standard functions, like number() and string(), but
the comparison functions convert them by calling the secure functions, like
sec-number() and sec-string().
Secure Functions for Numeric Operators
XPath 1.0 defines five numeric operators which include +, -, *, div, and mod.
Their corresponding secure functions are: sec-addition(), sec-subtraction(),
sec-multiply(), sec-div() and sec-mod().
The semantics of the numeric security functions is the same as that of those
standard numeric operators, except that the standard numeric operators con-
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vert operants to numbers by calling the standard number() function, but the
numeric security functions convert their arguments to numbers by calling the
secure sec-number() function.
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Figure A.1 The Definition of The Query Rewriting
[4] EqualityExpr ::= RelationalExpr
{ $$ = $1 }
| EqualityExpr ’=’ RelationalExpr
{ $$ = "sec-eq( $1, $3 )" }
| EqualityExpr ’!=’ RelationalExpr
{ $$ = "sec-ne( $1, $3 )" }
[5] RelationalExpr ::= AdditiveExpr
{ $$ = $1 }
| RelationalExpr ’<’ AdditiveExpr
{ $$ = "sec-lt( $1, $3 )" }
| RelationalExpr ’>’ AdditiveExpr
{ $$ = "sec-gt( $1, $3 )" }
| RelationalExpr ’<=’ AdditiveExpr
{ $$ = "sec-le( $1, $3 )" }
| RelationalExpr ’>=’ AdditiveExpr
{ $$ = "sec-ge( $1, $3 )" }
[6] AdditiveExpr ::= MultiplicativeExpr
{ $$ = $1 }
| AdditiveExpr ’+’ MultiplicativeExpr
{ $$ = "sec-addition( $1, $3 )" }
| AdditiveExpr ’-’ MultiplicativeExpr
{ $$ = "sec-subtraction( $1, $3 )" }
[7] MultiplicativeExpr::= UnaryExpr
{ $$ = $1 }
| MultiplicativeExpr MultiplyOperator UnaryExpr
{ $$ = "sec-multiply( $1, $3 )" }
| MultiplicativeExpr ’div’ UnaryExpr
{ $$ = "sec-div( $1, $3 )" }
| MultiplicativeExpr ’mod’ UnaryExpr
{ $$ = "sec-mod( $1, $3 )" }
[16] Step ::= AxisSpecifier NodeTest Predicate*
{ $$ = "$1 $2 [sec-inview()] $3" }
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[35] FunctionName ::= Qname - NodeType
{ switch(Qname)
case id:
replace id with sec-id
case string:








replace number with sec-number
case sum:





Correctness Proof of the XPath
Query Modification Algorithm
B.1 Objective and Assumptions
The objective of the proof is to show the correctness of Theorem 1. We prove it on
the basis of the following assumptions:
1. The root node of an XML document is accessible with respect to user u.
2. The context node nc in the initial context is accessible with respect to user u.
3. The original expression qu does not contain functions that are not defined in
the XPath core function library.
4. The input arguments of functions are always objects of the four basic types.
5. The original expression qu is in the verbose syntax.
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B.2 Notation
1. D denotes an XML database instance.
2. D′ur denotes the user u’s valid read accessibility view on D.
3. qu denotes an XPath expression, posted by u, whose corresponding rewritten
expression is q′u.
4. e denotes the initial evaluating context whose corresponding rewritten context
is e′.
5. e.u denotes the context user in evaluation context e.
6. qu(D) denotes the result of evaluating qu against D.
7. qu(D
′
ur) denotes the result of evaluating qu against the view D
′
ur.
8. L(XPath) denotes the set of all XPath expressions.
9. L(XPathk) denotes the set of k-level XPath expressions.
B.3 Proof Skeleton
We prove that the theorem holds on L(XPath) by induction on the expression level
k.
Base Case:
We wish to show that the theorem holds for L(XPath1).
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The grammar of XPath illustrates that an expression in L(XPath1), i.e., an
atomic expression, must be in one of the following five forms: a float number,
a quoted string literal, a variable reference, a location step without predicates,
or a function call without arguments. We prove that the theorem holds for
these five cases in three steps.
First step: suppose qu is an atomic expression in one of the first three forms.
According to the query modification algorithm, we have q′u = qu. If qu is in
one of the first three forms, the result of qu is independent of the database.





Second step: suppose qu is a location step without predicates. Then, qu
is either a relative expression in the form of Axis::NodeTest or an absolute
expression in the form of /Axis::NodeTest. The difference between a relative
expression and an absolute expression is that a relative expression is evaluated
with respect to the current context node, whereas, an absolute expression is
evaluated with respect to the document root. According to the assumption,
the context node (i.e., the e.nc) and the document root (addressed by “/”) are
both accessible with respect to the context user u. Thus the proof for these
two cases are actually the same. We give a proof for the relative expression
as an example.
According to the query modification algorithm, if qu is Axis::NodeTest, the
rewritten expression q′u would be Axis::NodeTest[sec-inview()].
Assume that n is an arbitrary node in Axis::NodeTest(D′ur). It must satisfy
the following conditions:
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1. n is an accessible node in D, as n ∈ D′ur.
2. The relationship between n and the context node e.nc satisfies the Axis.
3. The node type and the expanded-name of n satisfies the NodeTest.
Consequently, n must also be a node in Axis::NodeTest[sec-inview()](D).
Similarly, assuming n is an arbitrary node in Axis::NodeTest[sec-inview()](D).
It must satisfy the following conditions:
1. The relationship between n and the context node e′.nc satisfies the Axis.
2. The node type and the expanded-name of n satisfies the NodeTest.
3. n is an accessible node in D. Since the security policy to be enforced is
a valid policy, we have n ∈ D′ur.
Consequently, n must also be a node in Axis::NodeTest(D′ur).
Therefore, we have q′u(D) = qu(D
′
ur).
Third step: suppose qu is a function call without arguments. The XPath spec-
ification shows that there are 11 standard functions that may not take argu-
ments. Of the 11 functions, 4 functions are insecure. They are the string(),
the string-length(), the normalize-space(), and the number(). We will
show the proof for these 4 insecure functions in Section B.4.
Hypothesis:
Assume that the theorem holds for L(XPathi), where 1 ≤ i ≤ k for some
integer k greater than or equal to 1.
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Induction Step:
We wish to prove that the theorem holds for L(XPathk+1).
Recall that a (k + 1)-level expression is an expression that applies one opera-
tion to a number of subexpressions whose maximum level is k. According to
the hypothesis, we know that the theorem holds for all of the subexpressions.
Therefore, to prove that the theorem holds on a (k + 1)-level expression, we
just need to show that the rewriting of that operation is correct.
The following list illustrates all of the possible operations an expression may
take.
1. Comparison Operations: =, !=, <, >, <=, >=
2. Numeric Operations: +, -, div, mod, *
3. Logical Operations: or, and
4. Navigation Operators: /
5. Predicates: applying a “predicate” operation to an expression means
appending the predicate at the end of that expression.
6. Function Calls: applying a “function call” operation to a number of
expressions means calling that function with those expressions as argu-
ments.
We classify the operations into six categories: the comparison operations,
the numeric operations, the logical operations, the navigation operations, the
predicates, and the function calls. In the following sections, we will prove
that the rewriting of the operations in these six categories is correct.
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B.4 Proof for Function Calls
Since the results of secure functions are solely determined by the evaluating context
and the input arguments (if available), it is easy to see that evaluating a secure
function against D′ur equals evaluating that function against D, given the same
evaluating context and arguments. That is, the theorem holds if the (k + 1)-level
expression is a function call to a secure function.
In the remainder of this section, we prove that the theorem holds if the (k + 1)-
level expression is a function call to an insecure function.
Of the 27 standard functions defined by the XPath specification, 6 are insecure
functions: id(), string(), string-length(), normalize-space(), number(),
and sum(). We prove them separately.
string() Function
Suppose qu is string(p), where p is a k-level expression. According to the
query modification algorithm, the rewritten expression q′u is sec-string(p
′),
where p′ is the rewritten expression for p. We prove that the theorem holds for
the expression qu in three steps. First step: suppose p(D
′
ur) yields an object o
which is of one of the following three types: a number, a boolean, or a string.
According to the definition of sec-string(), the result of sec-string(p′)(D)
is equal to the result of string(p)(D). As the string value of o is independent
of the database, the result of string(p)(D) must be equal to the result of
string(p)(D′ur). Thus, we have sec-string(p
′)(D) = string(p)(D′ur).
Second step: suppose p(D′ur) yields a node set. If the node set is empty, it is
easy to see that the theorem holds, as both string(p)(D′ur) and sec-string(p
′)(D)
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will return an empty string. If the node set is not empty, we assume that n is
the first node in the node set. Obviously, n is an accessible node that appears
in both D and D′ur.
Assume that string(p)(D′ur) yields a string s1, and sec-string(p
′)(D) yields
a string s2. Let N1 be the set of text node descendants of n in D
′
ur, and N2
be the set of accessible text node descendants of n in D. According to the
definition of the string() function, s1 is the concatenation of the string values
of the nodes in N1 in document order. Similarly, according to the definition
of sec-string() function, s2 is the concatenation of the string values of the
nodes in N2 in document order. Since D
′
ur is a view of D, D
′
ur and D must
share the same document order. Therefore, to prove that s1 is equal to s2,
we only need to show that N1 is equal to N2.
Pick an arbitrary node i from N1. According to the definition of N1, node i
must satisfy the following conditions:
1. i is a node in D′ur. That is, i is an accessible node in D.
2. i is a text node.
3. i is a descendant of n.
Obviously, n ∈ N2, as it satisfies all of the criteria of N2.
Similarly, pick an arbitrary text node i from N2. According to the definition
of N2, node i must satisfy the following conditions:
1. i is a text node.
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2. i is a node in D.
3. i is a descendant of n.
4. i is accessible.
Obviously, n ∈ N1, as it satisfies all of the criteria of N1.
Thus, we have N1 = N2.
A string() function may be called without arguments, in which case qu
is an atomic expression like string(), and the rewritten expression q′u is
sec-string(). According to the definition of string(), if the argument
is omitted, it defaults to a node set which contains only the context node.
That is, the expression string() is actually equivalent to the expression
string(N), where N is a node set that contains only the context node.
In the previous proof, we have shown that the theorem holds for expres-
sion string(N). Therefore, the theorem must also hold for the expression
string().
id() Function
Suppose qu is id(p), where p is a k-level expression. According to the query
modification algorithm, the rewritten expression q′u is sec-id(p
′), where p′
is the rewritten expression for p. We prove that the theorem holds for the
expression qu in two steps.
First step: suppose p(D′ur) yields an object o which is of one of the following
three types: a number, a boolean, or a string. We assume that id(p)(D′ur)
yields the node set N1, and sec-id(p
′)(D) yields the node set N2.
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According to the definition of function id(), a node n ∈ N1 must satisfy the
following conditions.
1. n ∈ D′ur. That is, n is an accessible node in D.
2. The id of n is a token that appears in the string value of p(D′ur).
Similarly, according to the definition of function sec-id(), a node n ∈ N2
must satisfy the following conditions.
1. n is a node in D.
2. n is accessible
3. The id of n is a token that appears in the string value of p′(D).
According to hypothesis, we have p(D′ur) = p
′(D) = o. Since the string value
of o in D is equal to the string value of o in D′ur, we have N1 = N2.
Second step: suppose p(D′ur) yields a node set N . According to the definition
of sec-id(), a node n ∈ sec-id(p′)(D) must satisfy the following conditions:
1. n is a node in D.
2. n is accessible.
3. The id of node n appears in the concatenation of the secure string values
of the nodes in node set N in D.
Since the secure string value of a node in D is equal to its string value in D′ur,
n must also be a node in id(p)(D′ur).
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Similarly, according to the definition of id(), a node n ∈ id(p)(D′ur) must
satisfy the following conditions:
1. n is a node in D′ur.
2. The id of node n appears in the concatenation of the string values of the
nodes in node set N in D′ur.
Since the secure string value of a node in D is equal to its string value in D′ur,
n must also be a node in sec-id(p′)(D).
Thus, we have sec-id(p′)(D) = id(p)(D′ur)
number() Function
Suppose qu is number(p), where p is a k-level expression. According to the
query modification algorithm, the rewritten expression q′u is sec-number(p
′),
where p′ is the rewritten expression for p. We prove that the theorem holds
for qu in two steps.
First step: suppose p(D′ur) yields an object o which is in one of the following
three types: a number, a boolean, or a string. According to the definition of
sec-number(), sec-number(p′)(D) converts the object o to a number by call-
ing the standard number() function. As the number value of o is independent
of the database, it is easy to see that
sec-number(p′)(D) = number(p)(D′ur)
Second step: suppose p(D′ur) yields a node set N . According to the definition
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of function sec-number(), the sec-number(p′)(D) converts the secure string
value of N to a number as if by calling the standard number() function. Since
the secure string value of a node set in D is equal to the string value of a
node set in D′ur, we have
sec-number(p′)(D) = number(p)(D′ur)
A number() function may be called without arguments, in which case qu is
an atomic expression like number(), and the rewritten expression q′u would
be sec-number(). According to the definition of function number(), if the
argument is omitted, it defaults to a node set that contains only the context
node. That is, the expression number() is actually equivalent to the expres-
sion number(N), where N is a node set that contains only the context node.
In the previous proof, we have shown that the theorem holds for the expres-
sion number(N). Therefore, it is obvious that the theorem also holds for the
expression number().
sum() Function
Suppose qu is sum(p), where p is a k-level expression that returns a node set.
According to the query modification algorithm, the rewritten expression q′u
must be sec-sum(p′), where p′ is the rewritten expression for p.
Suppose p(D′ur) yields a node set N . According to the definition of function







Since we have proven that
sec-number(n)(D) = number(n)(D′ur)











Suppose qu is string-length(p), where p is a k-level expression that returns
a string. According to the query modification algorithm, the rewritten expres-
sion q′u must be sec-string-length(p









u(D) = s. According to the definition of sec-string-length(),
the sec-string-length(p)(D) will return the number of characters in string
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s. It is easy to see that
string-length(p)(D′ur) = sec-string-length(p
′)(D)
A string-length() function may be called without arguments, in which
case qu is an atomic expression like string-length(), and the rewritten
expression q′u would be sec-string-length(). According to the definition
of function string-length(), if the argument is omitted, it defaults to the
string value of the context node. That is, assuming n is the context node and
s is the string value of n in D′ur, the expression string-length()(D
′
ur) will
return the number of characters in s. Similarly, according to the definition of
function sec-string-length(), if the argument is omitted, it defaults to the
secure string value the context node. In the previous proof, we have shown
that the string value of the context node in D′ur is equal to the secure string
value of the context node in D, i.e., string(n)(D′ur) = sec-string(n)(D).
Therefore, it is easy to see that the theorem also holds for the expression
string-length().
normalize-space() Function
Suppose qu is normalize-space(p), where p is a k-level expression that re-
turns a string. According to the query modification algorithm, the rewritten
expression q′u must be sec-string-length(p
′), where p′ is the rewritten ex-
pression for p.
Suppose p(D′ur) yields a string s. According to the hypothesis, we have
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p(D′ur) = p
′(D) = s. According to the definition of sec-normalize-space(),
the sec-normalize-space(p)(D) will return the normalized string of s as if
by a call to the standard normalize-space() function. It is easy to see that
the following equation holds.
normalize-space(p)(D′ur) = sec-normalize-space(p
′)(D)
A normalize-space() function may be called without arguments, in which
case qu is an atomic expression like normalize-space(), and the rewritten
expression q′u would be sec-normalize-space(). According to the definition
of function normalize-space(), if the argument is omitted, it defaults to the
string value of the context node. That is, assuming n is the context node and
s is the string value of n in D′ur, the expression normalize-space()(D
′
ur) will
return the normalized string value of s. Similarly, according to the definition
of function sec-normalize-space(), if the argument is omitted, it defaults to
the secure string value the context node. In the previous proof, we have shown
that the string value of the context node in D′ur is equal to the secure string
value of the context node in D, i.e., string(n)(D′ur) = sec-string(n)(D).
Therefore, it is easy to see that the theorem also holds for the expression
normalize-space().
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B.5 Proof for Comparison Operators
XPath 1.0 defines 6 comparison operators which include =, !=, <, >, <=, and >=.
Since the proof for comparison operators are quite similar, we show one example
proof for the = operator.
Suppose qu is an expression like p1 = p2, where p1 and p2 are two path expres-
sions whose levels are less than or equal to k. According to the query modification









rewritten expressions of p1 and p2 respectively.
Assume p1(D
′
ur) yields an object o1 and p2(D
′
ur) yields an object o2. We prove
that the theorem holds for the expression qu in three steps.
First step: suppose neither o1 nor o2 is a node set. If one of o1 and o2 is a
boolean, according to the definition of the operator =, the result of (p1 = p2)(D
′
ur)




ur). According to the
definition of sec-eq(), the result of sec-eq(o1, o2)(D) is equal to the result of
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Second step: suppose that both o1 and o2 are node sets. If the result of (p1 =
p2)(D
′
ur) is true, according to the definition of the operator =, there must exist a
node n1 ∈ o1 and a node n2 ∈ o2 such that the string value of n1 in D′ur is equal
to the string value of n2 in D
′
ur. Since we have shown that the string value of a
node in D′ur is equal to its secure string values in D, it is easy to see that the result
of sec-eq(p′1, p
′





true, according to the definition of sec-eq(), there must exist a node n1 ∈ o1 and
a node n2 ∈ o2 such that the secure string value of n1 in D is equal to the secure
string value of n2 in D. Again, since the secure string value of a node in D is equal
to its string values in D′ur, it is easy to see that the result of (p1 = p2)(D
′
ur) must







Third step: suppose that one of o1 and o2 is a node set. Without loss of
generality, we assume that o1 is a node set.
Suppose o2 is a number. If the result of (p1 = p2)(D
′
ur) is true, according
to the definition of the operator =, there must exist a node n1 ∈ o1 such that
the result of number(string(n1))(D
′
ur) = o2 is true. Since string(n1)(D
′
ur) =
sec-string(n1)(D), we know that number(sec-string(n1))(D) = o2 must be true.
Consequently, the result of sec-eq(p′1, p
′
2)(D) must be true. Similarly, if the result
of sec-eq(p′1, p
′
2)(D) is true, according to the definition of sec-eq, there must exist
a node n1 ∈ o1 such that the result of number(sec-string(n1))(D) = o2 is true.
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Since sec-string(n1)(D) = string(n1)(D
′
ur), we know that number(string(n1))(D
′
ur) =
o2 must be true. Consequently, the result of (p1 = p2)(D
′
ur) must be true. Thus,













B.6 Proof for Numeric Operators
XPath 1.0 defines 5 numeric operators which include +, -, *, div, and mod. Since
the proof for these numeric operators are quite similar, we show one example proof
for the + operator.
Suppose qu is an expression like p1+p2, where p1 and p2 are two path expressions
whose levels are less than or equal to k. According to the query modification









rewritten expressions of p1 and p2 respectively.
According to the definition of numeric operators, (p1 + p2)(D
′
ur) will convert its
operands to numbers as if by a call to the standard number() function and return



























B.7 Proof for Navigation Operators
Suppose qu is an expression like p1/p2, where p1 and p2 are two path expressions
whose levels are less than or equal to k. According to the query modification algo-








2 are rewritten expressions
of p1 and p2 respectively.
According to the definition, the result of (p1/p2)(D
′
ur) is computed in two steps.
First, p1(D
′
ur) is evaluated to generate a node set, say N1. Then, for each node in
N1, the expression p2(D
′
ur) is evaluated with that node as the context node. The
union of the sets of the nodes identified by p2(D
′
ur) is the final result set. According
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B.8 Proof for Predicates
Suppose qu is an expression like p1[p2], where p1 and p2 are two path expressions
whose levels are less than or equal to k According to the query modification algo-








2 are rewritten expressions
of p1 and p2 respectively.
According to the definition, the result of p1[p2](D
′
ur) is computed in two steps.
First, p1(D
′
ur) is evaluated to generate a node set, say N1. Then, for each node
in N1, the expression p2(D
′
ur) is evaluated with that node as the context node;
if the p2(D
′
ur) evaluates to true, then the node is included in the final result set.



















B.9 Proof for Logical Operations
XPath 1.0 defines 2 logical operators: the operator or and the operator and. Since
the proof for these 2 logical operators are quite similar, we show one example proof
for the or operator.
Suppose qu is an expression like p1 or p2, where p1 and p2 are two path expres-
sions whose levels are less than or equal to k. According to the query modification
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expressions of p1 and p2 respectively.
According to the definition of the operator ||, the expression (p1 or p2)(D
′
ur)




ur) is true. Simi-
larly, the expression (p′1 or p
′
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